oxford law - the faculty and its members : matthias klatt

Matthias Klatt joined New College as a Junior Research Fellow in October 2005. He concurrently holds an Emmy Noether Research Fellowship by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Previously, he had been a law clerk at the German Federal Constitutional Court (Karlsruhe), after completing his legal education in Goettingen, Munich, Kiel, and Duesseldorf. He had also served as research and teaching assistant at the Chair for Public Law and Legal Philosophy, University of Kiel. His doctoral thesis was addressed to questions of the theory of legal argumentation. He is a memeber of the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, and has taught in various places abroad.

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00373.x

ISBN: 1467-9337

M Klatt, Theorie der Wortlautgrenze. Semantische Normativität in der juristischen Argumentation. (Nomos 2004)

English Abstract: Two central issues lack a clear answer in English theory of legal argumentation. Firstly, the relation between the literal and the purposive approach in statutory interpretation. Secondly, the relation between applying the law and making the law. A clear answer to both problems can be found in the German doctrine of 'the limits of the wording' which is defended in this book. This book provides a detailed account of, in Lord Steyn’s words, ‘what meanings the language is capable of letting in’. The judge’s task does not end with the limits of the wording. Rather, the limits of the wording separate two distinct kinds of application of the law, namely interpretation and development of the law. The latter is, as a technical term, unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it is argued that this generates the inability to solve some of the crucial puzzles in jurisprudence. This book therefore introduces a new and important method to Anglo-American jurisprudence. At its centre, the book addresses legal indeterminism. Linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy are at the heart of the book. The entire second chapter is devoted to the philosophy of language, and spells out the normative character of interpretation as emphasized by Raz. With the help of Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of interpretation from a normative perspective does not at all justify scepticism but, on the contrary, supports the claim that legal argumentation can be objective. It is maintained here that statements on the meaning of a statute can be right or wrong, and take on inter-subjective validity accordingly. In that respect, this book breaks new ground in applying Brandom’s philosophy squarely to theoretical legal problems.

ISBN: 978-3-8329-0539-2