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	text:  larger  smaller		Grant Lamond University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy  Grant Lamond is University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College. He studied Philosophy and Law at the University of Sydney and clerked for the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia. He took the BCL at Magdalen College, and was a Junior Research Fellow at St Edmund Hall, where he completed his DPhil on practical reasoning. He has taught at the University of Melbourne and King’s College London. Subject groups : Criminal Law : Introduction to Law : Philosophy of Law All Publications | Recent | Selected    sorted by year | sort by title G Lamond, 'Precedent' (2007) 2 Philosophy Compass 699-711 DOI: doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007 URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00092.x Abstract: Precedent is a central feature of legal practice, requiring courts to follow decisions reached in earlier cases, thereby transforming the decisions in individual cases into a source of law. This article examines two major questions associated with precedent: (a) how to characterise the way that precedent operates as a source of law; and (b) how to justify the requirement that courts follow earlier decisions regardless of the merits of those decisions. Precedents are often thought to create general legal rules, but it is controversial whether this is the best way to understand their role in legal reasoning. Equally, it is unclear that the most common justifications for precedent unequivocally vindicate the practice. G Lamond, 'What is a Crime?' (2007) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 609-32 DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqm018 Abstract: This article presents a philosophical account of the nature of crime. It argues that the criminal law contains both fault-based crimes and strict liability offences, and that these two represent different paradigms of liability. It goes on to argue that the gist of fault-based crimes lies in their being public wrongs, not (as is often thought) because they wrong the public, but because the public is responsible for punishing them, i.e. because they merit state punishment. What makes wrongs deserving of punishment is that they are seriously blameworthy, inasmuch as they evince a disrespect for the values violated. But they only merit state punishment when they violate important values, not simply due to the well-known pragmatic considerations against the use of the criminal law, but to the intrinsic expressive force of criminal conviction. Finally, the analysis of fault-based crimes points to a role for strict liability in regulating actions that are not seriously blameworthy but do increase the risk of values being damaged. ISBN: 0143-6503 G Lamond, 'Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning' (2006) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (e-pub) Abstract: Arguments from precedent and analogy are two central forms of reasoning found in many legal systems, especially Common Law systems. Precedent involves an earlier decision being followed in a later case because both cases are the same. Analogy involves an earlier decision being followed in a later case because the later case is similar to the earlier one. The main philosophical problems raised by precedent and analogy are these: (1) when are two cases the ‘same’ for the purposes of precedent? (2) when are two cases ‘similar’ for the purposes of analogy? and (3) in both situations, why should the decision in the earlier case affect the decision in the later case? ISBN: 1095-5054 G Lamond, 'Do Precedents Create Rules?' (2005) 11(1) Legal Theory 1-26 DOI: 10.1017/S1352325205050019 Abstract: This article argues that legal precedents do not create rules, but rather create a special type of reason in favour of a decision in later cases. Precedents are often argued to be analogous to statutes in their law-creating function, but the common law practice of distinguishing is difficult to reconcile with orthodox accounts of the function of rules. Instead, a precedent amounts to a decision on the balance of reasons in the case before the precedent court, and later courts are required to decide cases on the basis that the earlier decision was correctly decided. ISBN: 1469-8048 G Lamond, 'Coercion and the Nature of Law' (2001) 7(1) Legal Theory 35-57 DOI: 10.1017/S1352325201071026 ISBN: 1469-8048 Correspondence address: Balliol College, Oxford OX1 3BJ Link to Balliol College Link to University email/phone directory in new window